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Richard C. Sheehan
,IL HEprospect of federal government deficits total-
ing $907 billion between 1985 and 1990 has renewed
doubts about the Feder’al Reserve’s ability to conduct
independent monetary policy. Often implicitly under-
lyingthese doubts is the fear that increases in federal
debt will drive up interest rates and slow economic
growth in the absence of expansionary monetary pol-
icy. Given the magnitude of projected federal deficits,
many analysts are concerned that the Federal Reserve
may feel obliged to increase the money stock faster
than it otherwise would to keep interest rates from
rising.’
It isthe purpose ofthis paper to offersome evidence
on the extent to which theFederal Reserve hasaltered
monetary policy in response to federal deficits.’ The
focus here is to determine if monetary policy has re-
acted to federal deficits in a consistent manner over
time. The sensitivity of monetary actions to debt
growth is considered over different time periods and
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‘Sargent and Wallace (1981) have gone so far as to argue that the
Federal Reserve has only a choice between increasing the money
stock sooneror later. While Darby (1984) has disputed this conten-
tion, the issue apparently remains unresolved. See Miller and
Sargent (1984).
‘The process of a debt increase directly leading to expansionary
monetary policy is often labeled “monetizing the debt.” Given the
ambiguities surrounding that phrase, it is not used here. See Thorn-
ton (1984) for a detailed explanation of alternate definitions of the
phrase.
under alternative measures of monetary actions and
debt.
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Thetextbook viewof the relationship between mon-
etary policy and federal debt can be demonstrated in
the context of asimple comparative static money mar-
ket model, which is summarized in figure 1. Let us
assume that money demand fMDI is a function of the
interest rate and the level of income and that the
Federal Reserve can effectively fix the money supply
IMSI. With some initial level of income, money de-
mand and supply functions may be represented by
MD,, and MS,,, respectively. Given astructural (or exog-
enous or active) change in fiscal policy, say, an expan-
sionary action increasing the deficit. income will rise
in the short run.’ This increase in income, in turn, will
lead to an increase in money demand, shifting the
money demand curve from MD,, to MD, in figure I and
driving up interest rates. If the Federal Reserve is
operating with a monetary aggregate target, monetary
policy will not respond to the deficit. The structural
‘A change in fiscalpolicy, that is, a change in the behavior of fiscal
policymakers, is considered structural, exogenous or active. Thus, a
fiscal-policy-induced change in the deficit, as one measure of fiscal
policy, also is considered exogenous. It is assumed that the fiscal
policy change and resulting deficit change are not prompted by a
change in the business cycle. A change in the deficit resulting from a
change in, say, real GNP is considered cyclical, endogenous or
passive. See Tatom (1984) for a more extensive discussion of the
distinction between active and passive deficits.
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Figure 1
Comparative Static Money Market Model
deficit will not alter the money stock
the interest rate from r,, to r,.’
With cyclical (or endogenous or passive) fiscal pol-
icy changes, however, the impact of changes in the
structural deficit is quite different. Assume the econ-
omy enters a recession as a result of a non-policy
shock to the system. The automatic stabilizing proper-
ties of federal taxes and expenditures will lead to a
cyclical increase in the deficit as income declines.
Furthel-, the decline in income will reduce the de-
mand for money, shifting the money demand sched-
ule, say, from MD, to MD,, in figure 1. Again, if the
Federal Reserve is using a monetary aggregate as its
target, the money stock will remain constant. An in-
crease in the cyclical deficit will now be accompanied,
however, by a reduction in the interest rate from r, to
r,,. With a monetary aggregate target, this model im-
plies that structural deficits will lead to increases in
the interest rate. while cyclical deficits will be accom-
panied by decreases in the interest rate.
In contrast, if the Federal Reserve is using the fed-
‘This discussion assumes loanable funds demand is not completely
elastic. It further assumes the Federal Reserve is focusing on a
monetary aggregate and will not change its desired value of that
aggregate in the face oftemporary fluctuations in income.
but will increase
eral funds rate as its target, the increase in the struc-
tural deficit and the resulting increase in money de-
mand will prompt it to r-espond differently. The
increase in interest rates as money demand increases
from MD,, to MD, would lead the Federal Reserve to
increase the money supply ffrom MS, to MS,l suf-
ficiently to drive interest rates in general and the fed-
er’al funds rate in particular back to their original lev-
els.’ With an interest rate target, the exogenous deficit
increase would not influence the interest rate but
would increase the money stock.
Ifthe Federal Reserve has not followed a pure inter-
est rate or monetary aggregate target but instead has
followed amixed strategy using both, a structural defi-
cit would still shift the money demand curve out as
before, but the money supply curve would shift out
only partially, say, from MS, to MS,.” Thus, the struc-
MD1 tural debt increase would lead to both higher interest
rates and higher money growth.
With a federal funds target and an increase in the
MD o cyclical deficit leading to a decrease in money de-
mand from MD, to MD,,, the Federal Reserve would
decrease the money stockfrom MS, to MS,, to keep the
interest rate unchanged-with a mixed targeting strat-
egy and an increase in the cyclical deficit, the money
supply would be expected to shift partially downward
from MS to MS,. Thus, the increased deficit would be
accompanied by a lower interest rate and a lower
money supply.
Whether an increase in the deficit is accompanied
by incr’eases or decreases in the money stock and
interest rates depends on the source ofthe deficit and
on the manner’ in which the Federal Reserve is con-
ducting policy. The alter’natives are summarized in
tablet.
It should be noted that agiven deficit may combine
structural and cyclical elements. In that case, the im-
pact of the deficit on the interest rate is ambiguous if
the Federal Reserve targets on a monetary aggregate;
its impact on the money supply is ambiguous if the
Fed targets on interest rates. Both impacts would be
ambiguous with amixed targeting procedure. Further,
ther’e is no guarantee that the Federal Reserve has
followed (or will follow) aconsistent pattern of target-
‘It the Federal Reserve is operating with an interest rate target, it is
also necessary to assume that the Federal Reserve believes that
money changes can alter interest rates — as they do in this simple
model — and that the Fed has a willingnesstoalter the money stock
based on that belief.
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From 1958 to 1984, theFederal Reserve intermediate
policy targets apparently underwent substant’ral revi-
sion. For example, through the 1%tis, it is generally
assumed that the Federal Reserve’s primary concern
was controlling interest rates? Monetary aggregates
began to receive more attention in the early 1970s.
From October 1979 to October 1982, there was an em-
phasis on monetary aggregate targeting; since then
aggregate targeting has become more flexible with less
prominence given to Ml.’ Thus, at least four regimes
can be identified: Ii) from 1958 to approximately 1970,
characterized by interest rate targeting, (2) from the
early1970s to October1979, amixed targeting strategy,
(3) from October 1979 to October 1982, a monetary’
aggregate target, and (4) from October 1982 to the
present, again a mixed targeting strategy. While it
would prove fruitful to examine “reaction functions”
estimated separately over each of these periods, the
short time frames of the latter two periods preclude
that option. Thus, the sample is divided into twosub-
periods, the flrst prior to 1971 characterized by inter-
est rate targeting and the second from 1971 with a
greater focus on monetary aggregates.
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There have been a number of previous studies that
have examined the relationship between monetary
‘See Lombra and Moran (1980) and Wallich and Keir (1979).
‘See Thornton (1983) and the sources cited there.
policy and federal deficits. Most of these studies fall
under the general heading of estimating a ‘reaction
function” for the Federal Reserve? The reaction func-
tion approach assumes that the Federal Reserve’s pol-
icy actions are based on its goals, its model of the
economy and the constraints that the model implies.
Thus, the estimated reaction function is based implic-
itly — or explicitly in the case of McMillin and Beard
(1980) — on output and financial market models, to-
gether with a rule (that is, an assumption about how
the Fed will react to disturbances to reach its goals) for
determining Federal Reserve behavior. CQmbining the
behavioral assumptions of the policy rule with the
output and financial market models predicts how the
Federal Reserve will react to disturbances to the eco-
nomic system — hence, a “reaction function.”
Previously estimated reaction functions have dif-
fered with respect to the choice of dependent and
independent variables, thefunctional form employed,
the time period used for estimation and the conclu-
sions based on that estimation. They also have
reached different conclusions about the stability of
the estimated reaction function. Thus, it is useful to
briefly surveypreviously estimated reaction functions.
Three variables commonly have been employed as
the dependent variable, that is, as themeasure ofmon-
etary policy. Niskanen (1978) and Barro (1977) among
others use a measure of the money stock, Ml, assum-
ing that the money stock is thebest indicator of mone-
tary policy during the period of estimation. Froyen
(1974), Levy (1981), and Barth, Sickles, and Wiest (1982)
use the monetary base instead, contending that the
base corresponds more closely to open market opera-
tions and is a good measure of exogenous monetary
policy actions. The third alternative, used by Abrams,
Froyen, and Waud (1980),DeRosa and Stern (1977),and
Flavrilesky, Sapp, and Schweitzer (1975), is the federal
funds rate. They argue that this variable is a more
appropriate measure ofmonetary policy in periods in
which the Federal Reserve is targeting on interest
rates. They further contend that the Federal Reserve,
in fact, has targeted interest rates during most of the
post-World War IIperiod.
Previously estimated reaction function estimates
also have used a wide range of independent variables
and have assumed alternate goals of the Federal Re-
‘For example, see Allen and Smith (1983), Barth, Sickles, and Wiest
(1982), Froyen (1974), Hamburger and Zwick (1981, 1982), Levy
(1981), McMiilin and Beard (1980, 1982). Two studies that do not
use the reaction function approach are Dwyer (1982) and Thornton
(1984). For a detailed statement of the deficit problem, see Tatom
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serve (e.g., pr-ice stability, low unemployment, high
real gr-owth rates and financial mar-ket stability). Most
previous studies have used ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimation techniques, and independent varia-
bles generally are included with no mor’e than one
lag.”
The estimation r-esults have been inconsistent in a
number of respects. For example, using the monetary
base as the policy measure, Allen and Smith 1983)
found that the unemployment rate was significant,
while Levy (19811 found it insignificant. On the impact
of the debt, included as a measure of financial market
stability, Levy concluded that debt growth influenced
monetary policy, while Hambur-ger and Zwick (1981)
r’eached exactly the opposite conclusion. On the sta-
bility of the estimated reaction function, Allen and
Smith (1983) argued in favor of a stable relationship;
Abrams, Froyen, and Waud (1980) reported findings of
instability. It is unclear to what extent these differ-
ences are due to different sample periods, the choice
ofindependent variables, the specification ofthe mon-
etary policy variable or the use of different functional
forms.”
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The basic reaction function approach is also em-
ployed here. Two alternative monetary policy mea-
sures are used as dependent variables: the money
stock (Ml) and the federal funds rate (i~~), given that the
Feder’al Reserve has alternately focused on interest
ratesand the money stock.” Tofurther allow compari-
son ofthe estimation results with the potential rela-
tionships between monetary policy and deficits as
presented in table 1, we employ two measures ofdebt
growth in the following empirical analysis: the net
federal debt )NFD) and the high employment deficit
IHEBDL”
“Levy (1981) used instrumental variables and Abrams, Froyen, and
Waud (1980) used 3SLS. Froyen (1974) and studies using Barro’s
(1977) basic specification used more than one lag.
“See Barlh, Sickles, and Wiest(1982) or McMillin and Beard (1981)
for a more extensive review of the reaction function literature.
Thornton (1984) uses a different framework focusing on the
“causal” relationships between monetary policy and debt rather
than using a reaction function approach. Hisresults are consistent
with the findings of the reaction function literature. There apparently
exists a relationship between monetary policy and federal debt, but
this finding is sensitive to the period of analysis chosen as well as
the precise measure used for debt.
“The monetary base is not used as a measure of monetary policy
since Thornton (1984) has shown the linkage between debt growth
and the monetary base is influenced by a number of otherfactors.
“Previous reaction functions have generally used either NFD or
HEBD although Froyen (1974) used both in the same equation.
Neither ofthese two measur-es is aperfect indicator’
of the pressure on the Federal Reserve to alter policy
in response to changes in federal debt. NFl) is poten-
tially influenced by macroeconomic shocks, which
may also havean impact on (or- be the result of) mone-
tary policy. Thus, NFD includes both str’uctural and
cyclical components. NFL) does have the advantage of
including off-budget items, and the recent gr-owth in
off-budget items may represent substantial additional
pressure on monetary policvmakers.” The HEBD mea-
sure is adjusted forreal income changes.”Thus, it may
beconsidered ameasure ofstructural policy changes.
HERD, however, does not include off-budget items.
The equations are estimated over the interval from
1/1958 to 111/1984 (except wher-e noted) as well as over
the subperiods fi-om 1/1958 to lV/l970 and from 1/1971
to 111/1984. The entire period is best characterized in
terms of table I as a mixed targeting pr-ocedure. The
eariy subperiod is basically a time of interest r-ate tar-
geting, while the latter conforms most closely to a
monetary aggregate targeting procedure.
The estimated equations are of the form presented
below, a specification similar to that of Froyen (1974):
K
(ltX, = o,, +E a~X,+ ~ ftZ, + ~
i=1 (=0 k=o
where X ameasur’e of monetary policy;
Z avector of measures ofthe goals and con-
straints of the Federal Reserve;
D a measure of debt;
and a, I~, and -y are the estimated parameters.
‘the right-hand-side variables include lags of the
dependent variables as well as current and lagged
values of the stabilization objectives or goals used by
the Federal Reserve.” Included in the specification are
the general price level (P5 the unemployment rate
(PR), and alternately each of the two measures of fed-
eral debt. Following the pr-evious reaction function
‘~For example, off-budget items totaled $17.3 billion in fiscal year
1982.
“See deLeeu’w and Holloway (1982).
“Froyen has noted that the estimated reaction function actually rep-
resents aloint test of the influence of the chosen stabilization goals
and constraints together with the appropriateness of the chosen
dependent variable. Lags of the dependent and independent varia-
bles are included (1) to allow gradual adiustment to goals so that
monetary policy is not a source of instability and (2) to capture the
effect on monetary policy of variables omitted from the model.
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literature, interest rate terms are included in the
money equation, while money terms are included in
the interest rate equation.
All variables were included in log difference form
except for HEBU,which is included in level form. Max-
imum laglengths were arbitrarily restricted to 12 lags
on the dependent variables and six lags for the other
right-hand-side variables. The choice of appropriate
laglength was then determined by Aldake’s final pre-
diction error (FPE) criterion.” flben the FPE search for
the preferred lagspecification indicated that no values
of a right-hand-side variable improved the specifica-
tion, that variable was dropped from the basic equa-
tion. Except when noted, a variable was included in
theestimated equation only when an F-test oh itsjoint
coefficients indicated it was significant at the 10 per-
cent level. Two-stage least squares was used as the
estimation technique to avoid problems of simul-
taneity.”
ESTIMNI71O.tSJ RESULTS
The reaction function results estimated over the
1958—84 period are presented in tables 2 and 3. Tables
4 and 5 include the results of equations estimated
from 1958 to 1970, while tables 8 and 7 present results
of equations estimated over the 1971—84 interval. The
focus of the following discussion is on the debt varia-
ble and the extent to which federal deficits have in-
fluenced monetary policy. The debt coefficients are
interpreted in light ofthe predicted coefficient signs
from table 1.
Full Pericnl Resulls
Table 2 presents the equations estimated initially
with NFD as an independent variable. The top part of
the table presents the coefficient sums and the t-
statistics on whether that sum is significantly different
from zero. At the bottom of table 2, the significance
“See Batten and Thornton (1984). In one instance below, the FPE
chose the maximum lag length allowed. In that case, the maximum
lag length was increased butfurther lagswere insignificant.
“Only one equation is estimated, and this periods inflation, unem-
ployment rate, etc., may be influenced by this period’s monetary
policy. In the first stage, each of the dependent variables was re-
gressed on 10 lagsof itself and four lagsof all othervariables in the
model. The maximum lag lengths were arbitrarily restricted. The
second stage,reported in the text, replaces the current values of the
independentvariables with the first stage estimates. If HEBD were
an exogenous policy tool, the use of an instrument for HEBD would
be unnecessary. There is no reason, however, to assume that
current fiscal policy is independentof, say, current monetary policy
actions.
Table 2
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federal funds rate equation since the sum of its coef-
ficients is significant at the 10 percent level. A1per-
cent increase in NFD lowers the federal funds rate by
an estimated 2.56 percent. Since NED contains both
structural and cyclical components, based on table 1,
it appear’s that the cyclical component of NED domi-
nates the structural component in the federal funds
rate equation. Further. since NED significantly enters
the federal funds rate equation, the Federal Reserve
apparently did not follow a pure interest rate strategy
over the 1958—84 period. This result is consistent with
the hypothesized mixed targeting procedure.”
The HERD results presented in table 3 apparently
yield conclusions at odds with these results. With the
HERD measure, the deficit has a significant positive
impact on the money stock but no impact on the
federal funds i-ate; consequently, it was omitted from
the final estimated federal funds equation. Given
HERD as ameasure ofthe structural deficit, the impact
of HERD on Ml and ~i sconsistent with the Federal
Reserve, on average, pursuing an interest rate target-
ing strategy during the 1958—84 period.
Theconditions presented in table 1, however, repre-
sent only sufficient conditions for the structural defi-
cit to have no impact on the federal funds rate. tn
otherwords, it is not necessarvforthe Federal Reserve
to be targeting interest rates in ordei- to generate the
result that HERD does not influence i,,,. For example, if
HERD is small relative to the loanable funds market or
if the supply of loanable funds is interest-elastic, then
HERD would have little influence on ~FF even with, say,
a mixed targeting strategy.
Further, there is evidence to suggest that the struc-
tural deficit represents arelatively small fraction ofthe
total demand forloanable funds. For example, in 1982,
HERD averaged $32.8 billion while net credit market
borrowing by nonfinancial sectors was $404.1 billion.
Thus, the HERD component of federal borrowing was
only 8.1 percent of funds borrowed. In contrast, on
average from 1975 to 1981, similar figures indicate
HERD was only 4.6 percent of net funds borrowed.
HERD may have little or no impact on interest rates
not because of the particular targeting procedure
used by the Federal Reserve, but rather because of the
small relative size of the structural deficit. Given this
interpretation, the results in table 3 are also consistent
with a mixed targeting strategy.
“Thecoefficients on the non-debtterms in table 2 deserve comment.
Inflation does not significantly enterthe Ml equation and unemploy-
ment enters with a negative coefficient.
Whilethe negative coefficient on the unemployment rate issignifi-
cant in all equations, its economic impact is minor. For example, a
reduction in the unemployment ratefrom 7.5 percent to 7.0 percent
would increase the growth rate of money by only 0.2 percent. The
procyclical response of monetarypolicyto the unemployment rate is
certainly not intuitive; it is, however, consistent with the findings of
Abrams, Froyen and Waud (1980).
Although the sum of the coefficients on the inflation term in the
federal funds rate equation is not significant, the joint impact is
significant. The short-run impacts are large in magnitude although
approximately offsetting over a year. Similarly, the sum ofthecoeffi-
cients on money growth in thefederal funds rate equation are not
significantly different from zero. Again, it is the result of offsetting
individual coefficients.
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consistent with the Federal Reservefollowing amone-
taiy aggregate target.
The federal funds rate equations estimated overthe
later period were similar to those forthe early and the
full periods. In contrast, the money stock equations
were substantially different in the later period. The
money stock equations chosen by Akiake’s FPE and F-
tests consistently imply that virtually all variables en-
tered, with the possible exception ofthe federal funds
rate and the inflation i-ate, are insignificant.
From the perspective ofestimating a reaction func-
tion that explains” much of the variation in the
money stock, the 1971—84 results leave much to be
desired. They are, however, consistent with two very
different theories of Federal Reserve behavior. First, it
is possible that over this period the goals of the Fed-
eral Reserve or the weights on those goals were chang-
ing frequently, perhaps due to shifts in money de-
mand, deregulation or financial innovations. tf true, it
would be impossible to estimate aconsistent relation-
ship between goals and the money stock. In the ex-
treme, the money stock after detrending would be a
random walk. Alternately, the Federal Reserve, on av-
erage, may have followed a constant money growth
r-ate rule. In this case, the money stock after detrend-
ing would also be a random walk. Either of these hy-
potheses would be consistent with a poorly perform-
ing short-run reaction function for the money stock.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
‘rhis paper has examined whether federal debt
growth has influenced alternate measures of mone-
tars’policy. Itwas demonstrated that a structural defi-
cit would have very different implications than acycli-
cal deficit. A structural deficit in the static model pre-
sented here could lead to an increase in money
growth andlor interest rates. tn contrast, a cyclical
deficit could be accompanied by a decrease in money
growth and/or interest rates. Whether debt alters
money growth or interest rates depends on the nature
of the targeting strategy used by the Federal Reserve.
The results of a reaction function, developed and
estimated over-alter-nateintervals, suggest that prior- to
1971 debt growth did lead to money growth but did
not influence interest rates. Since then, debt growth
has not altered money growth but may have been
associated with interest rate changes. Net federal debt
growth, which combines both stwctural and cyclical
debt changes, is accompanied by a lower-federal funds
rate for the 1971—84 period. This result suggests that
cyclical debt changes dominate sti-uctural in NFD’s
effect on interest rates. In contrast, the high-employ-
ment budget deficit, a measure of structural debt
changes only, has had no impact on the federal funds
rate over any time period. This result may be due to
HERD’s small size in comparison with total credit de-
mands.
The results presented here ar-c consistent with
monetary policybeing independent of federal deficits
even though money mar-ket variables do apparently
respond to those deficits. During the period when the
Federal Reserve was targeting interest rates, the as-
sumed policy measure, the federal funds rate, was
unaffected by federal deficits. While the money stock
does respond to deficits in the early titne period. 1958—
70, the money stock was not being used as a policy
target in that interval. Conver-sely. in the later- period,
1971—84, the Federal Reserve paid more attention to
the money stock and less to interest rates. In that
interval, the primary policy variable, the money stock,
was again unaffected by federal deficits while those
deficits may have had an impact on inter-est i-ales.”
REFERENCES
Abrams, Richard K., Richard Froyen and Roger N. Waud. Mone-
tary Policy Reaction Functions, Consistent Expectations, and The
Burns Era,” Journal of Money, Credif and Banking (February
1980), pp. 30—42.
Allen, Stuart 0., and Michael D. Smith, “Government Borrowing and
Monetary Accommodation,” Journal of Monetary Economics (No-
vember 1983), pp. 605—16.
Barro, Robert J. “Unanticipated Money Growth and Unemployment
in the United States,” American Economic Review (March 1977),
pp. 101—15.
Barth, James R., Robin Sickles and Philip Wiest. ‘Assessing the
Impact of Varying Economic Conditions on Federal Reserve Be-
havior,’ Joumal of Macroeconomics(Winter 1982), pp. 47—70.
Batten, Dallas S., and Daniel L. Thornton, ‘How Robust Are the
Policy Conclusions of the St. Louis Equation?: Some FurtherEvi-
dence,” this Review (June/July 1984), pp. 26—32.
Darby, Michael R. ‘SomePleasant Monetarist Arithmetic,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review (Spring 1984), pp.
15—20.
deLeeuw, Frank, and Thomas M. Holloway. “The High-Employ-
ment Budget: Revised Estimates and Automatic Inflation Effects,”
Surveyof Current Business (April 1982), pp. 21—33.
DeRosa, Paul, and Gary H. Stern. “Monetary Control and the Fed-
eral Funds Rate,’ Journalof MonetaryEconomics (April 1977), pp.
217—30.
Dwyer, Gerald P., Jr. “Inflation and Government Deficits,” Eco-
nomic Inquiry (July 1982), pp.315—29.
‘~0nehypothesis not tested here is that the Federal Reserve has
shifted targets, say, from monetary aggregates to interest rates, in
response to federal deficits, This change would represent another
way in which debtgrowth could influence monetary policy.
32FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOU’lS MARCH 1985
Eisner, Robert, and Paul J. Pieper. “A New View of the Federal McMillin, W. Douglas, and Thomas R. Beard. “Deficits, Money and
Debt and Budget Deficits,” American Economic Review (March Inflation: Comment,’ Journal ofMonetary Economics (September
1984), pp. 11—29. 1982), pp. 273—77,
Froyen, Richard T. “A Test of the Endogeneity of Monetary Policy,” . ‘The Impact of Fiscal Policy on theMoney Supply in the
Journalof Econometrics (July 1974), pp. 175—88. U.S.: Theory and Empirical Evidence,’ Rivista Internazionale di
Hamburger, Michael J., and Burton Zwick. Deficits, Money and Scienze Economiche e Commercrali (1981), pp. 941—57.
Inflation,” Journal of Monetary Economics (January 1981), pp. - “The Short Run Impact of Fiscal Policy on the Money
141—50. Supply,’ Southern EconomicJournal(July 1980), pp. 122—35.
________ - “Deficits, Money and Inflation: Reply,” JournalofMone- Miller, Preston J., and Thomas J. Sargent. “A Reply to Darby,”
tary Economics (September 1982), pp. 279—83. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review (Spring
Havrilesky, Thomas, Robert H. Sapp and Robert L. Schweitzer. 1984), pp. 21—26.
Tests of the FederalReserve’s Reaction totheState of the Econ- Niskanen, William A. ‘Deficits, Government Spending, and Infla-
omy,” Social Science Quarterly (March 1975), pp. 835—52. tion: What is the Evidence?” Journal ofMonetary Economics (Au-
Hoffman, Dennis L., Stuart A. Low and Hubert H. Reineberg. “Re- gust 1978), pp. 591—602.
cent Evidence on the Relationship between Money Growth and Plosser, Charles I. ‘Government Financing Decisions and Asset
Budget Deficits,” Journal ofMacroeconomics (Spring 1983), pp. Returns,’ JournalofMonetary Economics (May 1982), pp. 325—52.
223—31 - Potts, Glenn T., and Dudley G. Luckett. “Policy Objectives of the
Levy, Mickey D. Factors Affecting Monetary Policy in an Era of Federal ReserveSystem,” QuarterlyJournalofEconomics (August
Inflation,’ Journal of Monetary Economics (November 1981), pp. 1978), pp.625-34.
35173. Sargent, Thomas J., and Neil Wallace. “Some Unpleasant Mone-
Lombra, Raymond E., and Herbert M. Kaufman. “The Money Sup- tarist Arithmetic,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly
ply Process: Identification, Stability, and Estimation,’ Southern ( )‘ ~
Economic Journal (April 1984), pp. 1147—59. Tatom, John A. “A Perspective on the Federal Deficit Problem,” this
Review (June/July 1984), pp. 5-17.
Lombra, Raymond and Michael Moran. “Policy Advice and Policy-
making at the Federal Reserve,” in Karl Brunner and Allan H. Thornton, Daniel L. “Monetizing the Debt,” this Review(December
Meltzer, eds., Monetary Institutions andthe Policy Process, Came- 1984), pp. 3043.
gie-RochesterConference Series on Public Policy (Autumn 1980), ________ - The FOMC in 1982: De-Emphasizing Ml,” this Re-
pp.5-68. view (June/July 1983), pp. 26—35.
Makin, John H. “Real Interest, Money Surprises, Anticipated Infla- Wallich, Henry C., and Peter M. Keir. “The Role of Operating
tion and Fiscal Deficits,” Reviewof Economics and Statistics (Au- Guides in U.S. Monetary Policy: A Historical Review,” Federal
gust 1983),pp. 374—84. ReserveBulletin (September 1979), pp. 679—90.
33